Following tense discussions on Syria at this past June’s G8 summit, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper remarked: “I don’t think we should fool ourselves. This is the G7 plus one.”
Mr. Harper’s comments, directed at Russia’s persistent support of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, underscore the very real difficulties that Canada and its allies face in working through inclusive institutions like the G8 and the United Nations. With Russia and China so often on a different page, consensus on major global challenges, from Syria to Iran to North Korea, is likely to remain illusive.
Yet multilateral co-operation is essential to dealing with the daunting array of threats facing the West. What is needed is a new mechanism for co-operation — one built around shared values and common interests.
A “democracies 10,” or D10, that brings together those states at the forefront of efforts to advance a liberal world order could provide a powerful mechanism for effective action on today’s most critical security challenges.
Existing forums fall short
During the Cold War, Canada, the United States and other major allies organized to collectively address the most important challenges facing the liberal world order. Through NATO, they worked to unify military capabilities and co-ordinate strategies to contain Soviet expansion. Later, the Group of Seven (G7), formed to promote economic co-operation among “advanced industrial democracies,” served also as a forum for joint consultation on political issues ranging from the communist threat in Italy to arms control with the Soviet Union. Both provided valuable platforms for like-minded co-ordination that ultimately helped the West prevail in its struggle against communism.
Today, the threats to a liberal world order are much more diffuse. They include outlier regimes such as Iran and North Korea seeking to acquire nuclear weapons; Islamic extremists targeting Western interests while forcing radical ideologies on their own people; dictators trampling on human rights and committing violent atrocities; and great power autocracies seeking to extend spheres of influence. Effective multilateral co-operation remains essential to address these challenges. Yet the like-minded lack a collective institutional entity through which to collaborate.
Where do allies turn, for example, to initiate a discussion on promoting human rights in Myanmar [Burma], address Russia’s crackdown on foreign NGOs or maintain an arms embargo on China? If Canada and other partners seek to jointly analyse options to support the Syrian opposition or prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, through what mechanism should they engage?
NATO may seem at first like an obvious choice. But NATO remains primarily focused on Euro-Atlantic defence co-operation and excludes Asian partners. Current threats and challenges require a wider set of partners and actions, from sanctions to foreign assistance to public diplomacy. Important objectives, such as the promotion of human rights and transnational justice, remain outside NATO’s purview.
What about the G8? As the recent summit in Northern Ireland made clear, the presence of Russia has neutered the group’s ability to address the tough security issues. And while the G20 group of the world’s leading economies holds promise on economic and financial issues, it lacks the consensus to take on an expanded agenda. With few other options, allies have looked to ad hoc coalitions, such as the Friends of Syria. While they offer flexibility, such groups are all about tactical co-operation on discrete issues rather than strategic co-ordination across global policy challenges.
Charting a new D10
To effectively tackle today’s global challenges, a new strategic framework is required — one that brings together like-minded allies in a standing entity focused on advancing international norms.
What would such a framework look like? A diplomatic initiative launched by Canada and the United States in recent years provides a useful conceptual model. In 2008, policy-planning directors from several democracies gathered in Toronto to launch a new dialogue on global challenges. Those invited to participate were committed to addressing certain threats and maintaining democratic values, with the requisite economic, military and diplomatic resources to act on a global scale. The resulting group included major transatlantic and transpacific allies — Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia and South Korea.
Subsequent meetings in Washington and Seoul were productive, but higher-level engagement is now required. It is time to convene the foreign ministers from these nine states to endorse and reinforce this construct. With the addition of the European Union, the D10 would account for more than 60 percent of global GDP and more than 75 percent of the world’s military expenditures.
The D10 would provide a mechanism for like-minded states to develop concrete strategies to address current security challenges and advance global norms — preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, deterring state violence against civilians, promoting democracy and human rights and countering terrorism while protecting civil liberties. Such a forum would also encourage a better alignment of strategic capabilities and enhance intelligence sharing among close allies — a noteworthy priority in light of the recent NSA spying allegations.
The West versus the rest?
But would creating the D10 come at the cost of encouraging a West-versus-the-rest dynamic that could further polarize the international community? Could such a forum undermine the already complicated efforts to work with Russia and China at the UN? Might it not antagonize rising democracies, such as India, Brazil and South Africa?
The D10 is premised on the assumption that prospects for meaningful action at the UN and other inclusive institutions on major security issues — at least in the near term — are dim. Russia and China are fundamentally opposed to the expansion of many of the liberal norms and principles long championed by the West. And while they share some common values and objectives, India and other rising democracies have been ambivalent about supporting Western-led actions to advance these objectives, particularly when it requires using coercive diplomacy.
Cognizant of these differences, it is unlikely that China, Russia or other powers would curtail co-operation with the West on issues they deem important to their interests, e.g. terrorism, global trade, simply because some states have added a new venue for consultation. From NATO to the Shanghai Co-operation Organization to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summits, an array of overlapping fora for multilateral engagement among major powers are already in place. Adding another to this list is unlikely to raise serious diplomatic concerns.
Still, as emerging powers gain influence and expand their global capabilities, it is important that the West seek ways to maintain and expand co-operation on issues of common concern. A smart and carefully balanced approach in organizing the D10 would ensure that such co-operation is not undermined.
First, the D10’s public presence should be muted. It would not entail high-publicity leaders‘ summits. Rather, the focus would be behind-the-scenes strategic co-ordination, guided by foreign ministers. Second, the West should emphasize the importance of the UN and the G20, and continue to work through them. The D10 would supplement, not replace, the G8 or any other existing multilateral framework. Finally, the West should deepen bilateral dialogues with rising powers to encourage their co-operation on issues of common concern.
Canada’s multilateral legacy
Canada has a long tradition in support of multilateralism. Its external affairs minister, Lester B. Pearson, played an instrumental role in the founding of NATO. Former prime minister Paul Martin served as an early advocate for what would become the G20 leaders summit. Given its multilateralist tradition, its close ties with the United States and its geostrategic position as a transatlantic and transpacific power, Canada is uniquely situated to help bring the D10 to fruition. The 2008 Toronto gathering highlights Canada’s important role in promoting co-operation among the like-minded.
D10 participants will not agree on every issue. Differences over strategy and tactics are certain to emerge. But as a new multilateral platform, the D10 would encourage policy consensus and strengthen co-operation among states that share common values and interests and continue to retain a preponderance of global power. In time, such an entity could serve as the core of an expanding circle of global partners committed to advancing a liberal world order.
David Gordon, a former director of the U.S. Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, is head of research at the Eurasia Group, an international political risk research and consulting firm. Ash Jain, a former member of the policy planning staff, is a non-resident fellow at the Washington, D.C.-based German Marshall Fund and author of Like-minded and Capable Democracies: A New Framework for Advancing a Liberal World Order (Council on Foreign Relations, January 2013).
